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Chapter Sixteen
El Salvador
Horizontalism and the Anti-Mining Movement 
Rose J. Spalding
The twenty-first century commodities boom expanded mining activities into 
new territory, producing conflicts that spread across Latin America. Rapid 
economic growth in China created an increased demand for agricultural and 
mineral exports, and a spike in prices drew new investments into the extrac­
tive sector. Global recession and economic uncertainty sparked heightened 
interest in the value of precious metals, and gold prices rose across the 
decade. Latin American governments on both the right and the left tended to 
support rapid expansion of the extractive sector. Those state leaders who 
embraced a neoliberal vision emphasized global integration through foreign 
investment and the economic logic of exploiting a “comparative advantage” 
in natural resources. Leaders on the left, while highlighting the need for 
greater national control, focused on extractive sector expansion to finance the 
growing social expenditures associated with more inclusive development.
Extension of the extractive frontier into new areas triggered rising resis­
tance and escalating conflict (Veltmeyer and Petras 2014; Bebbington and 
Bury 2013; Hogenboom 2012; Rasch 2012; Slack 2009; Kuecker 2008; 
Fulmer, Godoy, and Neff 2008). Mining struggles became persistent, particu­
larly in Indigenous territories where the concepts of “buen vivir” and the 
“rights of nature” had shifted public discourse and been embedded in new 
legal frameworks. In regions where contention over land rights festered and 
water scarcity had become acute, movements against mining and in defense 
of community survival and environmental rights deepened and spread. The 
Observatorio de Conflictos Mineros de America Latina (OCMAL) reported 
198 mining conflicts in nineteen Latin American countries in January 2014, 
up from 133 in fifteen countries in 2010.1 Growing evidence of long-term
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damage, not simply to individuals but to whole communities, triggered the 
development of tenacious and recurring anti-mining mobilizations.
Threats posed by mining to the local water supply and land use placed the 
well-being of many communities into jeopardy.2 Health and environmental 
damages, incurred as a result of both open-pit and underground mining, 
created spillover consequences for workers’ families and neighborhoods as 
contaminants spread by contact, wind, and water. At a time when the weak 
regulatory frameworks that had been promoted during the neoliberal period 
provided few constraints on investors, sweeping damage accumulated quick­
ly with little state monitoring or intervention. Heavy dependence on the 
mining industry for employment and tax revenues enhanced the power of 
mine executives, threatening democratic practices in areas where these were 
only weakly developed. Promised jobs and economic benefits often proved 
ephemeral; evidence mounted of persistent or deepening marginality inside 
mine-damaged communities across the region.
Growing awareness of harsh outcomes, whether directly experienced as 
mining advanced, recovered from documentation of earlier history, or ob­
served in similarly situated neighboring communities, increasingly called 
community activists to action. These contests pitted movements against both 
the extractive corporations and the state, including not just neoliberal govern­
ments on the right but also left-leaning governments that had embraced a 
“neo-extractivist” development strategy (Veltmeyer and Petras 2014; Beb- 
bington and Bury 2013; Becker 2013).3
The outcomes of these mobilizations varied widely, with many anti-min­
ing networks losing the immediate battle. Some, however, have registered 
partial victories, and others have successfully derailed the mining advance, at 
least in the opening round. In the process, environmental and community 
rights claims have gained attention, providing new territory for social move­
ment theory building and analysis. The anti-mining movement in El Salvador 
provides an instructive case study, demonstrating the ways in which a com­
munity-based movement grounded in horizontalist principles discussed fur­
ther below, expanded outward to connect with broader networks at both the 
domestic and international levels. It also illustrates the ways in which demo­
cratic decision making at home can be threatened by external pressures ema­
nating from international economic institutions and actors. The struggle to 
maintain local control, even as the locus of action shifted across scales, has 
imbued this conflict with both tensions and opportunities.
This chapter unfolds in four sections. The first provides an overview of 
development of the mining industry and the near-simultaneous advance of 
the anti-mining movement in El Salvador. The second section examines the 
national anti-mining coalition in greater detail, focusing on the movement’s 
grounding in local communities that had been targeted for mine development 
and the connections that were forged among local groups, national organiza­
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tions, and international allies. The third part identifies challenges faced by 
community and national-level mobilization processes when these networks 
face off against powerful adversaries operating through international eco­
nomic institutions. This section follows the trajectory of El Salvador’s anti­
mining movement as it engaged the investment dispute claims filed by pros­
pective foreign investors against the Salvadoran government. The final sec­
tion concludes by highlighting the continuing challenges facing horizontalist 
movements as they advocate for direct democracy, local autonomy, and sur­
vival rights.
THE ANTI-MINING MOVEMENT IN EL SALVADOR
Neoliberal reform advanced rapidly in El Salvador under successive adminis­
trations led by the pro-business Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) 
Party, which governed the country for twenty years (1989-2009). This devel­
opment strategy opened El Salvador to mining investment, with a favorable 
Mining Act approved in 1995 and Investment Law approved in 1999. Rising 
gold prices and a supportive legal framework drew exploratory investments 
from a number of small mining companies, which quickly located commer­
cial quantities of gold and other minerals.
As exploration advanced and the extraction permit process got under way, 
an opposition network began to emerge. The Mesa Nacional Frente a la 
Mineria Metalica (National Roundtable Against Metallic Mining, henceforth, 
the Mesa) was founded in 2005 to connect various sectors that had begun to 
organize around this issue. The local community organizations on which the 
Mesa built emphasized grassroots activism and horizontal connections, seek­
ing to withdraw from El Salvador’s post-civil war neoliberal state project, 
and construct local space in which to promote autonomous development. 
These grassroots organizations expanded outward to connect with national- 
level organizations promoting human rights and the inclusionary practices 
associated with liberation theology, and they thickened their engagement 
with a growing group of environmental activists. The resulting national net­
work expanded and consolidated over time and came to include thirteen 
organizations in 2008.4 The Mesa called for a legal ban on mining in El 
Salvador.
This apparatus embraced a number of principles and organizational char­
acteristics associated with horizontalism (Sitrin 2012, 3-4). These features 
included an emphasis on direct democracy and forms of autonomous deci­
sion making that rejected hierarchical controls; prioritization of survival and 
sustenance rights, with expansive implications for the concept of human 
rights; and close attention to the use and abuse of territory and physical
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space, a perspective that can lend itself to local-level activism and mobiliza­
tion against environmental damage.
The Mesa’s domestic struggle bore fruit, helping to split the ARENA 
leadership on the mining issue and bring the extraction permit process to an 
uneasy halt. As an informal mining moratorium went into effect, anti-mining 
activists joined with other citizens in 2009 to support the historic transition to 
new political leadership. The Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front 
(FMLN), established as a political party by demobilized revolutionaries fol­
lowing the 1992 peace process, had struggled for over fifteen years to open 
electoral space in the Salvadoran political system and to consolidate as a 
political party. Following its lopsided defeat in the 2004 presidential election 
with former guerrilla leader Schafik Handal as its candidate, the FMLN 
embraced Mauricio Funes, a center-left journalist who had not been part of 
the guerrilla struggle, as its standard bearer in 2009. Funes, appealing to 
moderates both inside and outside the party, narrowly won the election and 
ushered in a transition period following twenty years of ARENA dominance.
Under the Funes presidency (2009-2014), space for public debate about 
the impact of mining expanded. As a candidate, Funes had pledged to curtail 
metals mining. His inauguration was followed by a rising tally of assassina­
tions and threats against anti-mining activists. In Cabanas communities near 
the proposed Pacific Rim (Canadian transnational) gold mining project, 
Mesa affiliates Marcelo Rivera, Ramiro Rivera, and Dora Alicia Recinos 
Sorto were murdered between June and December 2009. Other members of 
local anti-mining groups endured kidnappings, assaults, vandalism, and 
death threats, with little protective intervention on the part of local authorities 
and weak prosecutorial efforts in the aftermath.5
In the face of growing violence, the incoming president took several 
procedural steps to check the mining industry and interrogate its claims of 
benign or beneficial effects. Internal and external pressures, however, limited 
the impact of these transitions. Internally, the administration faced the chal­
lenge of governing in the face of acute polarization and ARENA resistance. 
Externally, concern about disrupting carefully cultivated relations with the 
United States and possible cutoffs in aid, investment, and remittance flows 
served as a further constraint. Wedged between anti-mining campaign com­
mitments and formidable pro-mining pressures, the Funes administration 
eventually produced only a proposal for a mining moratorium of indefinite 
duration. The anti-mining movement’s quest for an unambiguous mining ban 
remained unfulfilled, creating unresolved tensions between this network and 
the Funes administration.6
With mine development thwarted by the continuing moratorium, two 
foreign mining companies filed claims against the Salvadoran government 
before the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID), the investment dispute settlement mechanism established by the
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World Bank. These companies had been empowered by policies adopted 
during the period of neoliberal advancement, which included “investor-state” 
provisions that allowed foreign investors to bring disputes with host states 
before international tribunals. These companies claimed that the mining mor­
atorium violated the terms of the recently implemented Central American 
Free Trade Agreement with the United States (CAFTA) and El Salvador’s 
own 1999 investment law. They demanded that the Salvadoran government 
be required by the ICSID tribunal to provide them with access to the with­
held extraction permits and to compensate them for revenues lost due to the 
moratorium.
As the anti-mining struggle was redefined by the investor challenges at 
the international legal level, El Salvador’s anti-mining movement adapted its 
international alliance structure to include a widening network of allies. As 
the campaign expanded beyond the affected communities and incorporated 
new organizations and actors further removed from the primary conflict site, 
the struggle to maintain the principles and strategies associated with move­
ment horizontalism intensified.
BUILDING THE DOMESTIC ANTI-MINING ALLIANCE
Local-Level Activism and Community Anchors
Local-level anti-mining activism centered on communities in an area that the 
mining companies labeled the “Gold Belt.” This area cut across the depart­
ments of Chalatenango, Cabanas, and Morazan in northern El Salvador, 
where local level activists had a long history of organizing around land rights 
before and during the Salvadoran civil war (1980-1992). The region in­
cluded several communities in which liberation theology advocates had been 
active in the 1970s and 1980s. Ethnographic studies of communities in this 
region have identified progressive catechists as “organic intellectuals” who 
served as agents of change, supporting popular participation and defiance of 
injustice (Binford 2004; see also Smith-Nonini 2010; Todd 2010; McElhin- 
ney 2004).7 The Salvadoran military carried out intense campaigns in this 
zone to uproot guerrilla strongholds. Many residents, including nonpartisans, 
were displaced, often forced into refugee camps across the border in Hondu­
ras. This extended refugee experience, especially in Mesa Grande, the largest 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) camps, 
provided a crucible in which new forms of revolutionary identity and practice 
were forged.
Molly Todd’s (2010) ethnographic study of the Salvadoran refugee expe­
rience during the war found that repeated exposure to wartime violence and 
forcible relocation, combined with the intense political and social work of 
rebuilding community in densely packed camps, frequently stoked a sense of
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connection that persisted over time. The mass flight undertaken by peasant 
refugees of northern El Salvador to escape military invasion required adher­
ence to discipline, sharing of resources, and mastery of secret codes that 
united survivors. The experience facilitated the formation of collective iden­
tity, defined by Polletta and Jasper (2001, 285) as “an individual’s cognitive, 
moral, and emotional connection with a broader community, category, prac­
tice, or institution.”
Life in the camps, which were vulnerable to assault by the Salvadoran and 
Honduran armed forces and were characterized by dependence on interna­
tional humanitarian efforts, fostered an intense organizational effort and the 
expression of internal cohesion among camp residents. Some of this behavior 
was performative, as refugees staged a presentation of coherence to mitigate 
their vulnerability and improve their leverage in the complex bargaining for 
resources. Tensions, both political and personal, erupted as well, requiring 
careful management, sometimes in covert ways, to avoid dispelling the por­
trayal of successful self-control and unity. But wartime experiences also 
shaped new community identities and reinforced the push for local empower­
ment. The refugees’ attempts at self-governance encouraged the develop­
ment of organizational practices that were often genuinely inclusionary, 
breaking down traditional generational and gender barriers and promoting a 
culture of sharing and solidarity.
Summarizing her findings about wartime peasant displacement, Todd 
(2010, 224) concludes,
one of the more striking aspects of this history is the campesinos’ emphasis on 
collectivity and, more specifically the horizontal relations within their ever- 
shifting mobile communities. They highlighted how the organizations they 
established, both within and beyond their home villages, had strong founda­
tions in the concepts of equality and justice. Members of directives and other 
committees, for example, were elected rather than appointed. In a similar vein, 
the workshops of the refugee camps gained staff and apprentices through a 
lottery cycle, which made the workshops accessible to all rather than a select 
few. Likewise, all refugees had the opportunity to attend school, receive health 
care, and vote in elections for (and serve as) representatives.
Salvadoran refugees, Todd argues, “came to see themselves as part of a sort 
of living organism, a body in which each part contributed to the survival and 
development of the whole” (2010, 224). Their work involved innovative 
strategies of self-governance and power sharing and introduced a push for an 
array of horizontalist principles, including local empowerment, autonomous 
decision-making, and direct action.
Popular education programs developed in mobile camps as dislodged 
populations migrated under the protection of the revolutionary army, FMLN. 
""Maestros populares” (informal teachers) introduced ""alfabetizacion inte­
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gral” (holistic literacy), using literacy training to re-envision Salvadoran 
history in order to transform it. Popular health promoters designed new 
health care systems in keeping with these emerging principles and practices. 
According to Smith-Nonini’s (2010, 6) ethnographic study of health delivery 
in repopulated communities in Chalatenango, the popular health services 
developed by these autonomous revolutionary communities were distin­
guished from those provided by traditional government programs in two 
main ways: the central role of practitioners who were trained through infor­
mal apprenticeship and lived as part of their communities; and their emphasis 
on a participatory approach to primary health care education and service 
delivery, designed to improve access and collective outcomes. These distinc­
tive practices, which emphasized lateral connections, community cohesion, 
local autonomy, and inclusivity, fostered a normative commitment to social 
solidarity and transformation.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, sectors of this displaced population 
pushed to return to villages in El Salvador, even as the war continued and in 
the face of military opposition to resettlement. This formidable act of resis­
tance intensified cohesion and demonstrated community capacity for autono­
mous decision making. The local organizations that emerged from this pro­
cess became forceful representatives of these outposts of civic resistance in 
the postwar era.
These displaced populations often developed supportive connections with 
the FMLN guerrillas, who were sometimes recruited from these villages and 
who frequently provided protection when community members were forced 
to flee. FMLN militants provided health and education services and training 
in mobile camps and, less openly, in refugee centers. Links between dis­
placed populations in northern El Salvador and the FMLN varied substantial­
ly, however, depending on local histories. This variation coincided with the 
sector of the five-part FMLN guerrilla alliance that dominated in each region. 
More centralized control was imposed on the refugees in Ejercito Revolucio- 
nario del Pueblo-dominated Morazan, for example, than on those displaced 
in Cabanas and Chalatenango, where the less-directive Fuerzas Populares de 
Liberacion Farabundo Marti and Resistencia Nacional had greater presence 
and reach (McElhinney 2004; Todd 2010). When the FMLN emerged as a 
political party after the 1992 peace accords, many of these linkages re­
mained.
Horizontalist movements are generally differentiated from revolutionary 
movements, which aim for state seizure in order to secure a top-down real­
ization of revolutionary transformation. They are also differentiated from 
routine forms of partisan politics in which the goal is electoral victory and 
the assumption of public office. In that sense, the links between progressive 
Salvadoran community organizations and the FMLN, as either a revolution­
ary military movement or a political party, may call into question the extent
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to which these mobilizations represent horizontalist struggles. In practice, 
however, the relationships between various types of movements can be quite 
fluid and situational. Whereas some, such as the Zapatista movement, es­
chewed participation in the formal political system, others had close and 
enduring party ties, and they moved regularly between formal institutional 
politics, transgressive antisystem mobilizations, and communal forms of pre- 
figurative activism (Almeida 2006; Prevost, Campos, and Vanden 2012).
The repopulated communities in El Salvador used an array of tactics in 
attempting to preserve space for autonomous development. They struggled to 
maintain war-honed traditions of transformative popular education and local 
health service delivery in the postwar period. They resisted, with limited 
success, the replacement of their locally designed health and education pro­
grams by the bureaucratic services of the central government (Smith-Nonini 
2010). They also responded to calls to mobilize in the capital in order to 
demonstrate their shared opposition to neoliberal reform, and they backed 
FMLN candidates in local and national level elections.
Revolutionary conviction and participatory practices withered, of course, 
in the inhospitable terrain of the postwar order. As the experience of revolu­
tionary struggle retreated further into the past, replaced by the more individu­
alistic and consumerist values of the consolidating neoliberal regime, even 
former communities in resistance were affected.8 Visible traces of commu­
nity activism and FMLN sympathy remained, however, in many repopulated 
communities, embedded in local history and living memory. Cultures of 
resistance, expressed in countless everyday practices, including nonheroic 
ones, can be quite enduring.9 Although cynicism about the outcome and the 
value of revolutionary struggle became palpable in many quarters as ARENA 
consolidated national control, independent leadership structures, locally de­
signed institutions, and interpersonal bonds persisted among many former 
allies in the war zone.
When mine exploration advanced in this resettled territory a decade after 
the peace accord, several community associations emerged as key local ac­
tors in the anti-mining movement. Chalatenango communities were repre­
sented by the Asociacion de Comunidades para el Desarrollo de Chalatenan­
go (CCR, Chalatenango Association of Communities for Development), the 
department-level affiliate of CRIPDES (Asociacion de Comunidades Rurales 
para el Desarrollo de El Salvador, Rural Communities Association for Salva­
doran Development), the national organization representing communities of 
rural people displaced by the war. Mining exploration in the department of 
Cabanas triggered mobilization by three additional community organizations, 
the Santa Marta-based Asociacion de Desarrollo Economico y Social 
(ADES, Economic and Social Development Association), the Asociacion de 
Amigos de San Isidro Cabanas (ASIC, Friends of San Isidro Cabanas Associ­
ation), and the Comite Ambiental de Cabanas (CAC, Cabanas Environmental
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Committee), all emerging in war-damaged communities located near pro­
posed mine sites. Although tattered by outmigration and economic stress, 
vestiges of participatory practices sometimes remained, expressed in local 
assemblies, safety patrols, and community radio stations that prioritized local 
stories, decommercialized the news, and facilitated daily communication 
among activists. Building on prior traditions of engagement and struggle, 
these community organizations were capable of rapid action and feisty mo­
bilization when threatened by a new round of dislocation.
Decentralization, local rootedness, agility, and spontaneity are evident in 
the origin stories told by anti-mining movement activists. Francisco Pineda, 
founder of the CAC and 2011 winner of the international Goldman Environ­
mental Prize, describes how a sudden drop in the water flow from the San 
Francisco River, the principal water source for small farmers in his commu­
nity, served as the catalyst for their mobilization in 2004 (Labrador and Meza 
2011). Pineda, a local leader with a long history of movement activism, 
including collaboration with the guerrillas during the civil war and work in 
reforestation and soil conservation in the late 1980s, was alarmed by reports 
of this unprecedented water loss.10 Tracing the riverbed upstream, his team 
came across heavy equipment being used to redirect the water flow. Further 
investigation revealed that a foreign mining company was conducting tests to 
determine the extent and commercial viability of nearby gold deposits. Acti­
vists learned that the cyanide-leaching gold mining process planned for the 
area would require massive amounts of water and raise the risk of toxic 
spills.
Unable to secure assistance from local authorities, who claimed there was 
nothing they could do, Pineda launched a community-by-community public 
awareness campaign. Drawing on his network of contacts and knowledge of 
the terrain, Pineda helped to mobilize a grassroots protest that quickly 
spread. As activists in other communities made similar discoveries, the pro­
tests multiplied. In November 2006, when the Canadian mining firm Pacific 
Rim moved in for exploratory work in Cerro Limon near Trinidad in the 
department of Cabanas, activists mobilized repeatedly, in ever-growing num­
bers, to demand eviction of the mine equipment. Telling the mine company 
work crew to haul the equipment away or it would be set on fire, protesters 
succeeded in getting the machinery dismantled and removed. Renewed 
rounds of protest in 2007 kept the mine work from advancing (“Comuni- 
dades se anotan ‘primera victoria”’ 2006; “Masiva protesta de comunidades” 
2007).
As this conflict escalated, local activists moved to assume an official 
identity, working with an association that had been created in 2004 in re­
sponse to other environmental problems. Describing the initial process of 
institutionalization, Pineda noted that, “We came to an agreement that no one 
would be president, nor would we have a formal structure, because we know
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that mine supporters would start to look for the leader in order to buy him or 
to kill him” (Labrador and Meza 2011, n.p.). Horizontalist principles of 
decentralization and avoidance of hierarchy were embraced, not simply as an 
ideological move to enhance egalitarianism, but as a survival strategy 
adopted in response to lethal threat.
Expanding the Network
As activists from the affected communities began to organize, they linked up 
with national-level organizations in the human rights and environmental acti­
vism fields. The Fundacion de Estudios para la Aplicacion del Derecho 
(FESPAD, Foundation for the Study of the Application of Law) and Unidad 
Ecologica Salvadorena (UNES, Salvadoran Ecological Unity) helped the 
emerging network to frame collective understanding of the implications of 
mine development, calling attention to the broader environmental hazards 
and the national implications in terms of water access and quality. Concerns 
about the impact of gold mining in the watershed of the Lempa River, the 
main water source for the country, raised a national alarm. Activist-aligned 
research centers, such as UNES and the Centro de Investigacion sobre 
Inversion y Comercio (CIECOM, Investment and Trade Research Center), 
documented El Salvador’s historical experience with mining and highlighted 
the social, economic, and environmental dangers associated with the process 
(Henriquez 2008; Lopez, Guzman, and Mira 2008; Erzinger, Gonzalez, and 
Ibarra 2008). Religious organizations, such as the Catholic social action 
agency Caritas-El Salvador and the Franciscan Justicia, Paz, y Ecologia (Jus­
tice, Peace, and Ecology), added another dimension to the alliance, connect­
ing the cause with what remained of El Salvador’s once-vibrant liberation 
theology movement.11
Water was an increasingly scarce resource in El Salvador, and it faced 
commodification and declining quality associated with environmental deteri­
oration and inadequate regulatory controls (Haglund 2010). As activist or­
ganizations reconfigured around the mining debate, they framed the gold 
mining industry as an environmental threat that jeopardized the already inad­
equate national water supply, raising questions about collective health and 
survival. This framework allowed the movement to broaden and incorporate 
the support of a wider array of political and social actors. Perhaps the most 
significant addition in 2007 was the Salvadoran Catholic bishops. Speaking 
with rare unity, the country’s ecclesiastical leaders joined the anti-mining 
campaign, as had fellow bishops in Honduras and Guatemala, and declared 
their opposition to the introduction of metallic mining in El Salvador (Confe- 
rencia Episcopal de El Salvador 2007). The inclusion of the bishops broad­
ened the anti-mining network beyond previously established parameters,
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bringing it into elite circles where Salvadoran social movements often faced 
a wall of silence or hostility.
As the anti-mining movement broadened domestically, it also built con­
nections with allies from across the region. In a process of “lateral transna­
tionalism,” the Salvadoran movement constructed alliances with anti-mining 
activists in neighboring countries, where similarly situated activists in com­
munity and environmental organizations were doing battle with mine inves­
tors. By lateral transnationalism I mean a variant of transnational mobiliza­
tion that is characterized by connections with similar and nearby networks, 
with whom there are few asymmetries of resources and an abundance of 
shared experiences (Spalding 2014). This form of transnationalism may be 
differentiated from “global transnationalism,” a generally thinner process 
that connects activists across the North-South hemispheric or international 
divide. In the latter process, activists often struggle with predictable tensions 
that jeopardize authentic collaboration, including asymmetrical resources, 
cultural misunderstandings, and verticalist tendencies. Lateral transnational­
ism, in contrast, builds on connections among activists and organizations in 
nearby settings, who often share a similar understanding of the problems they 
confront and have comparable resource profiles and needs. This collabora­
tion type, which may be of an informal and cross-border nature, can facilitate 
smoother information flows and mutual learning, along with innovative 
forms of regional strategizing and collective action.12
Gold mining in Honduras, which had begun several years previously, had 
produced population displacement and environmental contamination, includ­
ing a cyanide spill. Mounting evidence of damage triggered major demon­
strations, such as the protest march led by Honduran Cardinal Oscar Andres 
Rodriguez in March 2002 (Slack 2009, 125-26). The hard experience of 
trusted counterparts in Honduras encouraged community activists in El Sal­
vador’s Gold Belt to view the advent of mining with growing alarm. Anti­
mining activists in El Salvador frequently cited these collaborative consulta­
tions and on-site exchanges as a call to action. Cross-border engagement and 
information sharing multiplied as the number of mines in Honduras and 
Guatemala increased. Several of the new mines were located in close prox­
imity to Salvadoran territory and to the headwaters of the Lempa River. 
Growing awareness of environmental risks associated with mining raised 
calls for regional action to mitigate the dangers.13
Engaging the State
The extent to which horizontalist movements accept or reject engagement 
with the state has been a matter of discussion in activist circles. Although 
these movements, including several described in this volume, call for the 
creation of spaces free from state control and question the value of conven­
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tional forms of political participation represented by partisan campaigns and 
elections, advocates of horizontalist action often find it necessary to engage 
with state actors. In spite of a preference for action “against and beyond the 
state” (Sitrin 2012, 4), these activists may find it critical, at the same time, to 
make use of established political institutions.
In the Salvadoran anti-mining case, activists generally did not retreat 
from engagement with the state, nor did they detach their efforts from the 
formal political sphere of electoral politics. Arising, as many of them did, in 
the context of political polarization that defined wartime and postwar life in 
that country, social movements in El Salvador repeatedly intersected with 
political parties, giving rise to what Paul Almeida (2006) calls “social move­
ment partyism.” In this model, movements on the left generally aligned with 
the FMLN and those to the right connected with ARENA. The debate about 
mining could not be resolved without state action and policy change; engage­
ment with partisan politics and electoral processes provided one set of tools 
that activists could wield. Just as state policies and legal codes had encour­
aged mining investment to advance and protected it during the early explora­
tory stage, a change in state policy could now halt investment and provide 
relief. To achieve their objectives, anti-mining activists in El Salvador were 
compelled to engage in defensive mobilization, operating with and through 
the state.
Public protest, alliance building, and educational outreach can intersect 
with campaigns and elections to affect state action, particularly during criti­
cal junctures, when the durability of the dominant coalition is called into 
question. Electoral precariousness may even prompt market defenders to 
adjust their rhetoric and adapt their policies, at least temporarily. In the 
Salvadoran case, growing evidence of public dissatisfaction with mining led 
Salvadoran President Tony Saca (2004-2009) to delay the issuance of min­
ing permits and eventually initiate an informal mining moratorium, in spite 
of his ARENA affiliation. His actions revealed a cleavage in the dominant 
party between those who endorsed ARENA’S traditional enthusiasm for neo­
liberal reform, and those who registered the political cost of the mining 
initiative and sought to reduce it. In 2010 Saca led a breakaway from ARE­
NA, the Grand Alliance for National Unity (GANA, Gran Alianza por la 
Unidad Nacional), a party that competed unsuccessfully in the 2014 election.
Challenging ARENA in the 2009 presidential contest, FMLN candidate 
Mauricio Funes embraced the anti-mining position. With support from Mesa 
activists, among many others, Funes won the presidency, narrowly defeating 
ARENA’S pro-business candidate. As elsewhere in Latin America, social 
movement organizers generally aligned with “pink tide” candidates to chal­
lenge the advance of neoliberal reform. And as elsewhere, the subsequent 
relationship between activists and left-leaning leaders was not free of ten­
sion.
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Proceeding cautiously and seeking international technical validation for 
any mining policy change, the Funes administration secured funding from 
the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation and Development for a 
“Strategic Environmental Evaluation of the Metallic Mining Sector.” The 
resulting report, by the Spanish company Tau Consultora Ambiental (2011), 
identified seventeen areas in which legal and institutional reforms would be 
required and sixty-four actions that would be needed in order to provide an 
appropriate regulatory infrastructure for mining in El Salvador. This analysis 
emphasized the environmental vulnerability of the country and the opposi­
tion of organized civil society, citing these as factors that weighed against 
mine development. The report presented two scenarios: one in which the 
development of regulatory, monitoring, and accountability mechanisms pro­
duced an institutional infrastructure in which mining might be safely devel­
oped; and the other in which the vulnerability of the country to environmen­
tal crisis (earthquakes, hurricanes, flooding, land slides) and the improbabil­
ity of successful implementation of regulatory controls led to a decision to 
ban the industry. Based on this analysis, the ministers of the economy and the 
environment presented a joint proposal to the legislature in favor of a formal 
moratorium on metallic mining (Labrador Aragon 2012).
The Funes administration’s proposal for a formal moratorium was re­
jected by the Mesa’s anti-mining activists, who described it as “a demagogic 
and false solution” (Mesa 2012). Such a step, they argued, would only post­
pone the decision, allowing for an easy reversal under a future pro-mining 
administration. Arguing that mining should be banned by law, Mesa spokes­
people had worked with FMLN sympathizers in the legislative assembly to 
introduce a proposed mining ban in 2006. The unwillingness of the Funes 
administration to lend political capital to this legislative effort drove a wedge 
between the anti-mining activists and the administration. The willingness of 
FMLN legislators to introduce the measure, in contrast, reinforced the con­
nections between the movement and the party.
Unlike many cases in Latin America, in which left-leaning presidents 
actively supported the expansion of the mining sector, the president in El 
Salvador endorsed a mining moratorium. The clash between “pink tide” pres­
idents and anti-mining movements typically occurred when the administra­
tion prioritized the state’s need for increased revenues and sectoral employ­
ment over the survival needs of the community and the costs of long-term 
environmental damage. In Ecuador, for example, Rafael Correa’s neo-extrac- 
tivist economic policy, which drew on petroleum rents to fund social pro­
grams, pitted him against social movement activists that he denounced as 
“infantile environmentalists” (Becker 2013, 56-57). Criticizing the accelerat­
ed extractivism in new left regimes, Veltmeyer and Petras (2014, 39) contend 
that it “boils down to nothing more than the state striking a better deal with 
global capital regarding its share of the plundered resources.
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In the Salvadoran case, however, the extraction calculus was different, as 
was the outcome. Because the gold mining industry was not yet operative in 
El Salvador and was expected to be of limited duration, the projected reve­
nues in the form of royalties and taxes were hypothetical and, in any case, 
likely to be short term. In addition, the country’s small size, high population 
density, and water scarcity made the environmental risks loom large. The 
hinterland was not so distant; physical precariousness had a national scope. 
As the technical report about the prospective environmental and social costs 
of the industry raised a host of red flags, it was relatively easy for the Funes 
administration to respond to popular pressure by endorsing an official mining 
moratorium. He fell short of endorsing the proposed mining ban, however, in 
part because of mounting threats on the international front.
CHALLENGES ON THE INTERNATIONAL FRONT
In the weeks before Funes’s inauguration, two foreign mining companies 
launched an international legal claim against the Salvadoran government. 
Pacific Rim Cayman filed a claim for $77 million, an amount that was 
subsequently raised to $315 million in 2013.14 The U.S.-based Commerce 
Group followed suit, filing for $100 million in damages. Using protections 
provided in the 2004 CAFTA with the United States and the dispute settle­
ment provisions in El Salvador’s 1999 Investment Law, these companies 
claimed indirect expropriation by the Salvadoran government, based on their 
inability to secure extraction permits and the loss of projected future reve­
nues.
Using investor-state provisions embedded in bilateral investment treaties, 
free trade agreements, and national investment laws, transnational corpora­
tions have presented a growing number of claims against host states, alleging 
nonfulfillment of investor guarantees and seeking compensation. The World 
Bank’s investment dispute mechanism, ICSID, “revolutionized the relation­
ship between foreign investors and host countries with regards to dispute 
settlement” (Mortimore and Stanley 2009, 9). By the end of 2013, ICSID had 
registered a total of 459 cases, up from 81 in 2000 (International Centre for 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes 2014, 7). Latin American countries 
(minus Mexico) were represented in 34 percent of these cases, with South 
America being the single most affected global region (11). Twenty-six per­
cent of all ICSID cases involved claims in the oil, gas, and mining sector, 
twice as many as any other sector (12).
The use of international tribunals to pressure vulnerable states to accede 
to corporate demands has drawn intensified criticism in the legal, academic, 
and human rights communities (Orellana 2011; Fach Gomez 2011, 2012; 
Anderson and Perez-Rocha 2013; McDonagh 2013; Eberhardt and Olivet
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2012; Mortimore and Stanley 2009). The silent rise of international invest­
ment enforcement mechanisms has undermined the ability of states to 
strengthen social and environmental regulation and imposed increased finan­
cial burdens on countries where basic social services are already inadequate­
ly funded.15 This process also challenges the principles of democratic self- 
government by preventing elected officials from updating laws and policies 
in keeping with clearly stated voter preferences and national interests.
As complaints have grown about the insular and antidemocratic nature of 
the dispute settlement process, its domination by a small number of Northern 
law firms and arbitrators and its pro-corporate bias have drawn increasing 
criticism. In response, modest moves toward increased transparency have 
been introduced. One recent reform involved the admission of amicus curiae 
or “friend of the court” briefs into the proceedings. These legal briefs allow 
groups who are not litigants in the case, but whose interests would be af­
fected by the outcome, to present their perspective to the court. A 2006 
reform in the ICSID process followed two controversial arbitrations in which 
community claims for an amicus curiae process were advanced. The Aguas 
del Tunari, S.A. v. Bolivia case arose from the Cochabama Water War, and 
the Suez/Vivendi case against Argentina involved the distribution of water 
and sewage services. In both cases, a coalition of community groups re­
quested public access to the documents of the ICSID proceedings and asked 
for permission to submit an amicus brief, a petition that was denied in the 
first case and partially accepted in the second (Orellana 2011, 98-102; Fach 
Gomez 2012, 537-41).
As the number of such requests mounted and public controversy deep­
ened over the closed nature of the process, the tribunal agreed in 2011 to 
accept a short amicus brief from the anti-mining network in El Salvador. 
With assistance from the Washington, DC-based Center for International 
Environmental Law (CIEL), eight Mesa organizations made their case. Their 
brief identified the dispute as essentially a political, not a legal one. The 
conflict, they argued, was between the affected communities, seeking to 
exercise democratic rights and protect their own well-being, and the mining 
company, which was attempting to evade legal requirements and make back­
door deals with discredited public officials. Actions taken by the Salvadoran 
government to halt the permit process, they countered, were an attempt to 
advance the consolidation of a democratic political system, after long years 
of war, conflict, and polarization, and to respond appropriately to public 
pressure from Salvadoran civil society (CIEL 2011).
As this case advanced at the international level, the Salvadoran anti­
mining movement expanded its transnational alliance network. Mesa organ­
izations had long received assistance from a cluster of international non­
governmental organizations (INGOs) based in the global North. Many of 
these INGOs had long-standing relationships with the affected communities,
326 Rose J. Spalding
and several of them operated as semi-domestic actors. The Salvadoran Hu­
manitarian Aid, Research and Education Foundation (SHARE), the Commit­
tee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES), and the Sister 
Cities project were three U.S.-based solidarity initiatives with deep roots in 
El Salvador dating back to the civil war. These organizations had mobilized 
over the severe human rights violations committed during the war and the 
U.S. foreign policy that, by equipping and financing the Salvadoran military, 
shared responsibility for this outcome.16 Activists affiliated with these 
groups monitored the treatment of Salvadoran refugees in Honduras and 
assisted those refugees when they demanded the right of return (Todd 2010; 
Silber 2010; Smith-Nonini 2010).
Grounding their work in the concepts of “solidarity” and “accompani­
ment,” these organizations established enduring ties to local communities in 
resistance and continued to support their development in the postwar period. 
These activists used their relatively privileged position as U.S. citizens to 
echo their partners’ demands for local control and alternative forms of devel­
opment, reinforcing positions in both the United States and El Salvador that 
had been previously articulated by their community allies. As “domesticating 
INGOs,” they worked exclusively on El Salvador, developing a nontransfer- 
able mission strongly shaped by local frames.17
Other prominent international NGOs supporting the anti-mining move­
ment included Oxfam America, which had also established a long-term pres­
ence in El Salvador and partnered with a number of domestic networks and 
civic organizations. With its mission-based commitment to the empower­
ment of local communities and demand for “free, prior and informed con­
sent” before development plans were approved,18 Oxfam America bolstered 
various community-based initiatives in Central America, including those of 
several communities facing off against mining investors. This organization 
contributed to the Mesa’s anti-mining work in a variety of ways, including 
sharing information, financing research and publications, hosting internation­
al experts, participating in direct lobbying of key government officials, com­
missioning public opinion polls in the affected communities, and covering 
basic operating expenses for several partner organizations, including the 
Mesa (Spalding 2014, 173).
The Mesa’s network of transnational allies expanded rapidly as the min­
ing conflict escalated in El Salvador, and it included some with no prior 
experience in El Salvador. The growing numbers of assassinations and 
threats against Salvadoran activists, increased volume of investment dis­
putes, growing awareness of their costs, and rising profile of the Pacific Rim 
case, drew the attention of international supporters. With the assistance of 
new international allies, the Salvadoran anti-mining movement expanded its 
“repertoire of contention” (Tarrow 2005), adding new tactics and strategies. 
An international support group calling itself “The International Allies against
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Metallic Mining in El Salvador,” which had begun as a small network of the 
long-term solidarity organizations, expanded to include twenty organizations 
in mid-2013, as the Pac Rim v. El Salvador case emerged as an international 
cause celebre.19 The Allies sponsored international delegations and informa­
tional tours; organized protests outside the Canadian embassy, mining com­
pany headquarters, and the World Bank; and launched petition drives and 
letter writing campaigns that called on international and Salvadoran leaders 
to endorse the Mesa position in favor of a mining ban (International Allies 
Against Mining in El Salvador 2012).
The rapid expansion of this network in the United States, Canada, and 
Australia worked against the emphasis on horizontality and direct local ac­
tion that Salvadoran community activists had traditionally embraced. As dis­
cussed above, global transnationalism can introduce a series of distortions 
and open the door to replication of North-South power dynamics, even 
among well-intentioned northern activists. As the center of the mining con­
flict shifted away from El Salvador and into ICSID, however, Salvadoran 
activists were required to broaden their network at the international level, 
seeking information and resources needed to operate in global power centers. 
This tension calls us to theorize horizontalism across different contexts of 
struggle and to continue discussion of transnational movement strategies that 
best align with local empowerment.
As the Pac Rim case moved into the final phase of review in early 2014, 
the International Allies orchestrated a petition drive directed to World Bank 
president Jim Yong Kim. Signatories affirmed that Salvadoran communities 
“had been working through the democratic process to prevent a proposed 
cyanide-leach gold mining project, over well-founded risks that it will poison 
the local communities’ environment as well as the country’s most important 
river and source of water” (International Allies 2014, n.p.). Petitioners called 
for the World Bank to initiate an open review of ICSID, including public 
hearings that would incorporate community testimony, to determine it its 
dispute settlement process was consistent with the Bank’s stated anti-poverty 
and sustainable development mission.20
CONCLUSIONS
Examination of the Salvadoran anti-mining movement allows us to trace how 
local communities engaged in grassroots organizing to build decentralized, 
horizontal networks through which to seek autonomous development. Using 
participatory practices and a rights-based discourse that emphasized suste­
nance, sustainability, and survival, this network nurtured new thinking about 
the practice of democracy and the meaning of development. The anti-mining 
coalition in El Salvador used bridging and bonding techniques to connect
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community leaders fighting the intrusion of the mines with activists in na­
tional organizations pursuing environmental sustainability and an expansive 
definition of human rights. Aligning their struggle with religious and moral 
discourse concerning protection of nature and the centrality of the collective 
good, Salvadoran activists opened a larger conversation about the future of 
their country. Engagement with formal political processes (campaigns, elec­
tions, lobbying, and bill drafting) allowed this movement to employ a signifi­
cant array of tools as they looked for ways to defend the space for alternative 
development.
Political success in the domestic arena, however, is a limited good in an 
increasingly globalized market system. As the Salvadoran case demonstrates, 
international institutions that reinforce the neoliberal order continue to under­
mine local autonomy and challenge democratic practices, even in our pur­
portedly post-neoliberal moment. Horizontalist movements that seek to open 
space for cultural rights, participatory deliberation, and new forms of com­
munity building have responded by mobilizing at, but also beyond, the local 
setting. In spite of the heft of their adversaries and the challenges associated 
with constructing transnational solidarity networks, Salvadoran anti-mining 
activists are advancing a process of change at the global level. Continuing 
work at the local and global scales will be required in order to develop a new 
institutional order that prioritizes human rights, including environmental and 
cultural rights; encourages decentralization, allowing fluid choices and 
heterogeneity based on local preferences; and introduces a fairer set of eco­
nomic rules. The new horizontalism seeks to empower local and regional 
actors and to flatten the relations of power in a continuing effort to advance 
democratic inclusion and social justice.
NOTES
1. See http://basedatos.conflictosmineros.net/ocmal_db/ (accessed January 20, 2014) and 
http://www.olca.co/ocmal (accessed August 1, 2010). Chile and Peru registered 34 conflicts 
each, with parts of Mexico (29), Argentina (26) and Brazil (20) also witnessing numerous 
clashes. Central America (including Panama) reported 25 mining conflicts at the beginning of 
2014, 6 of them in Guatemala alone.
2. These conflicts can be particularly acute in Indigenous communities, where cultural 
rights are precarious and community identity has been repeatedly threatened. Efforts by inter­
national organizations to affirm the rights of Indigenous peoples to participate in development 
planning that impacts their communities have strengthened the legal hand of mining resisters in 
several regions. See, for example, Rasch 2012; Fulmer, Godoy, and Neff 2008.
3. Neo-extractivism is a Latin American development policy based on resources derived 
from the extraction of metals (gold and silver), minerals (primarily copper, zinc, lead, tin, 
lithium, bauxite, coal, and iron) and fuels (oil and gas). Several left-leaning governments in the 
region combine neo-extractivism with resource nationalism, a development approach that em­
phasizes state control over “resource rents,” that is, the fiscal gains from extraction acquired 
either through direct state ownership or through royalties and taxes paid by mining companies.
4. For a full list of Mesa members, see Henriquez (2008, 29n 15).
5. For detailed discussion of the deaths and violence directed against anti-mining activists, 
see Steiner 2010. The local government near the Pacific Rim site was controlled by ARENA, 
the party whose founder Maj. Roberto D’Aubuisson had organized death squads during El 
Salvador’s 1980-1992 civil war. Some of the assassinations of anti-mining activists bore the 
hallmarks of the old death squad techniques.
6. In the 2014 presidential election, victorious candidate Salvador Sanchez Ceren, a former 
FMLN guerrilla leader and Funes’s vice-president, claimed that metal mining is “a threat to 
life” and pledged to prevent any mining advance (Melendez 2014).
7. See also Wood’s (2003, 234-37) work on links between liberation theology and rural 
mobilization, and the resulting “pleasure in agency” such action induced in insurgent coopera­
tives and collectives in Usulutan.
8. Irina Silber (2010) describes the erosion of participatory practices and dismantling of 
community assemblies in Chalatenango, as emigration negatively affected that social texture. 
Leigh Binford (2013) documents the impact of massive outmigration on former revolutionary 
strongholds such as Morazan in northern El Salvador.
9. See Wickham-Crowley (1992, 130-40) on the concept of “rebellious cultures” and their 
contribution to guerrilla mobilizations and revolution in Latin America.
10. According to an interview with Pineda by El Salvador’s digital news source El Earn, 
Pineda’s father, a founder of the Union Nacional de los Trabajadores Salvadorenos, was assas­
sinated when his son was fourteen years old. Pineda’s own political activism began with the 
Movimiento Estudiantil Revolucionario de Secundaria, which became a base organization for 
the FMLN (Labrador and Meza 2011).
11. Several of these organizations had collaborated during the 2000-2003 movement against 
health care privatization. Six “white marches” had mobilized over 200,000 Salvadorans, who 
struggled to preserve and expand public health services and avoid the further dismantling of 
state institutions (Almeida 2008; Smith-Nonini 2010).
12. The shared experience of civil war and dislocation in the 1980s, combined with region­
wide natural disasters and environmental damage associated with hurricanes, drought, and 
flooding, tended to connect activists across Central America. In addition, exposure to repeated 
processes of neoliberal regionalism, such as the cross-regional infrastructure development pro­
ject, Plan Puebla-Panama (PPP), and the negotiation of CAFTA, Central America’s free trade 
agreement with the United States, provided common targets for resistance mobilization across 
the region. See Spalding 2014 and Alicia Sword’s contribution to this volume.
13. Growing concern about the cross-border consequences of mining in places like Cerro 
Blanco, a Guatemalan mine at the headwaters of the Lempa River, produced a call for cross- 
border regulation and the suspension of mining in neighboring countries (Procuraduria para la 
Defensa de los Derechos Humanos 2013).
14. In the ICSID process, the first round of review concerns whether a claim is significant or 
frivolous. Second round considers jurisdictional issues, to determine whether the ICSID tribu­
nal is authorized to review the case. The third round focuses on the merits of claims made by 
the entity filing the case (typically the investor), and the rebuttal provided by the respondent 
(typically the government), with a more detailed arguments and documentation required. As of 
April 2014, the Pacific Rim case is in this third phase of review. The tribunal ruled against the 
company’s claim to protection under CAFTA, rejecting the Canadian company’s assertion of 
status as a U.S. business (based on a shell operation it had opened in Nevada). The case was 
allowed to advance, however, under El Salvador’s 1999 Investment Law.
15. According to a study of the international investment arbitration process published by the 
Corporate Europe Observatory and the Transnational Institute, legal costs in investor-state 
disputes run more than US$8 million per case and may surpass US$30 million. Two cases 
brought by Fraport, a German airport operator, reportedly cost the Philippine government 
US$58 million, an amount that could have covered the annual salary of 12,500 teachers or 
vaccinated 3.8 million children (Eberhardt and Olivet 2012, 7).
16. For detailed discussion of the rich history of solidarity activism during the Central 
American civil wars, see Smith 1996; Nepstad 2004; Perla 2008.
17. Domesticating INGOs, by virtue of their long entrenchment in a country and durable 
commitment to local partners, come to function as quasi-national entities, engaging in cam­
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paigns, lobbying, and delegation work to reinforce the positions taken by their allies. See 
Spalding 2014 for further discussion of this typology of INGOs and debates about their roles.
18. ILO Convention 169 and the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
affirmed the right of Indigenous communities to “free, prior and informed consent” regarding 
development initiatives affecting their territory. The idea that community approval should be a 
prerequisite for development projects “is emerging more broadly as a principle of best practice 
for sustainable development” (Oxfam America 2013, 2).
19. http://www.stopesmining.org/j25/index.php/who-we-are2 (accessed July 26, 2013). The 
U.S. organizations included longtime allies SHARE, C1SPES, U.S.-E1 Salvador Sister Cities 
(2008 -2013), and Oxfam America, and expanded to include Institute for Policy Studies, CIEL, 
Friends of the Earth, Sierra Club, Maryknoll Office for Global Concerns, the Democracy 
Center, Voices on the Border, Jobs with Justice, the Washington Office on Latin America, 
Washington Ethical Society Global Connections Committee, Midwest Coalition Against Lethal 
Mining, National Lawyers Guild, and Miners and the Environment. The Canadian affiliates 
were Mining Watch Canada, Council of Canadians, and Canadians against Mining in El Salva­
dor. Pacific Rim was acquired by the Australian mining company Oceana Gold in late 2013, 
sparking the expansion of the Mesa’s international network into Australia.
20. The petition drive had secured 287 signatories from over 30 countries as of April 7, 
2014.
